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Drivers, and Implications for the Globalizing Entrepreneur
Abstract
The expansion and development of global financial markets has led to a rapid rise in foreign IPOs and listings.
As the opportunities for financing ventures have increased significantly, so has the complexity of decisions
facing entrepreneurs and others who need to tap into these markets. When equity can be sourced virtually
anywhere in the world, how do managers make decisions about listing a German firm on the Neuer Markt,
Nasdaq, or both? The authors draw upon academic literature and their own research on foreign IPOs on US
and German exchanges, as well as interviews with senior executives at firms that chose to list on a foreign
exchange. This chapter summarizes some of the key benefits that attract companies to list on foreign
exchanges, including gaining access to capital, offering liquidity to existing investors, enhancing the company's
reputation at home and abroad, providing currency for acquisitions in the foreign country, offering exit
opportunities, dispersing ownership geographically, and achieving a higher valuation. Against these benefits,
they present a set of costs, including underpricing and dilution, direct costs of the IPO, reporting
requirements, and recurring costs. By weighing these costs and benefits entrepreneurs can develop informed
strategies for taking advantage of globalizing equity markets.
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The expansion and development of global financial markets has led to a
rapid rise in foreign IPOs and listings. As the opportunities for financing ven-
tures have increased significantly, so has the complexity of decisions facing
entrepreneurs and others who need to tap into these markets. When equity
can be sourced virtually anywhere in the world, how do managers make deci-
sions about listing a German firm on the Neuer Markt, Nasdaq, or both?
The authors draw upon academic literature and their own research on for-
eign IPOs on US and German exchanges, as well as interviews with senior
executives at firms that chose to list on a foreign exchange. This chapter
summarizes some of the key benefits that attract companies to list on foreign
exchanges, including gaining access to capital, offering liquidity to existing
investors, enhancing the company’s reputation at home and abroad, provid-
ing currency for acquisitions in the foreign country, offering exit opportuni-
ties, dispersing ownership geographically, and achieving a higher valuation.
Against these benefits, they present a set of costs, including underpricing and
dilution, direct costs of the IPO, reporting requirements, and recurring costs.
By weighing these costs and benefits entrepreneurs can develop informed
strategies for taking advantage of globalizing equity markets.
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I nrecent years, a new trend in the capitalization of relatively young,growth-oriented firms has emerged. These firms can now accessforeign public equity capital markets. That is, these firms can raise
funds in public capital markets in countries other than the ones where
they were originally incorporated and headquartered. For example,
Infosys Technologies Ltd., a global IT services company was the first
Indian firm to be listed on the Nasdaq stock market. The Israeli com-
pany Check Point Software Technologies, which is the market leader
in Internet security and firewall systems, had its initial public offering
(IPO) on Nasdaq, and was added to the Nasdaq 100 index in 2000.
Similarly, Lycos Europe NV, based in Holland, went public on the
Neuer Markt in Germany.
While research on the globalization of public equity markets for
financing entrepreneurial firms is only beginning to appear,1 there has
been an increase in non-domestic IPOs on both Nasdaq in the United
States and the Neuer Markt in Germany. Since 1988, there have been
405 IPOs on the Nasdaq by non-domestic firms from 44 different coun-
tries, raising $50.35 billion of equity capital, or, on average, $125.5
million per issue. These non-domestic IPOs represented 8 percent of
the total number of IPOs on Nasdaq between 1988 and 2001, and
accounted for 19.5 percent of the equity capital raised by all IPOs on
Nasdaq in that period. On the other hand, the younger Neuer Markt
had a total of 313 IPOs, of which 44 (or 14 percent) were non-domestic.
The non-domestic issuers raised $4.5 billion on the Neuer Markt, aver-
aging $102 million per IPO.
As the total number of IPOs on Nasdaq grew, so did the number of
foreign listings – from three non-domestic listings on Nasdaq in 1988
to thirty-four in 1998 and seventy-eight in 2000. These non-domestic
listings amounted to 2 percent of the total number of companies listed
in 1988, growing to 12 percent in 1998 and 19 percent in 2000, before
dropping to about 9 percent in 2001. The growth of foreign listings
even outpaced the overall growth of the IPO market. While the overall
IPO market grew at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 5.9
percent from 1988 to 1998, and 7.5 percent from 1988 to 2000, non-
domestic listings grew at CAGRs of 24.7 percent and 28.5 percent
respectively.2
This trend in the globalization of the public equity market for
entrepreneurial finance, which has been mirrored in the simultaneous
globalization of private equity markets, is particularly interesting as
these markets are notoriously plagued by the presence of asymmetric
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Figure 10.1. Domestic vs. non-domestic IPOs.
information (moral hazard, adverse selection). With foreign firms, the
possibility of asymmetric information is heightened. As a result, the
question of why markets for public entrepreneurial finance globalize
so rapidly is interesting both theoretically and empirically. What can
help explain this phenomenon? And what are the implications of these
trends for the globalizing entrepreneur and for the leaders of corporate
ventures? To illuminate one significant factor in the formation and
rapid growth of entrepreneurial firms throughout the world, these are
the questions that will be addressed in this chapter.
The next section examines patterns of globalization of equity capi-
tal markets as they affect entrepreneurial firms. We then consider the
drivers and the tradeoffs inherent in globalization, examined through
the perspective of entrepreneurial firms. We conclude with a section
on implications for entrepreneurs of the globalization trend in capital
markets.
Patterns of non-domestic IPOs
As noted above, our research shows that foreign IPOs – those by firms
that have an original country of incorporation that differs from the
country where their securities are listed – have increased on both the
Nasdaq stock market in the United States and on the Neuer Markt
(NM) in Germany (see Figure 10.1).3 We focus on Nasdaq, which
began trading in February 1971 (see Figure 10.2 for its evolution),
because it is the largest and most developed market for high-growth
firms. We also chose the Neuer Markt, which was established in March
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2009
232 Raphael Amit and Christoph Zott
1971 On February 8, Nasdaq begins trading.
1984 Small Order Execution SystemSM becomes ready for use to execute
small orders automatically against the best quotations – making
greater volume and efficiency in trading possible.
1994 Nasdaq surpasses the New York Stock Exchange in annual share
volume.
1998 In conjunction with the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, Nasdaq
announces a partnership to provide investors worldwide with
information about their respective markets on a new, joint Internet
web service.
1999 Nasdaq becomes the largest stock market in the United States by
dollar volume and repeatedly breaks share and dollar volume
records. In June, Nasdaq signes an agreement in Tokyo with
Softbank Corporation, jointly capitalizing a new company – Nasdaq
JapanSM. This proves to be the first leg in Nasdaq’s global strategy to
link Asian markets with European and American markets.
2000 The restructuring spins off Nasdaq into a shareholder-owned,
for-profit company. Nasdaq completes the first phase of its
restructuring. Nasdaq formally opens the new Market Site in the
heart of New York’s Times Square. Nasdaq continues to be the
engine for capital formation and job creation. Between 1997 and
2000, it has brought 1,649 companies public, and in the process
raised $316.5 billion. Nasdaq continues to build capacity for the
trading volumes of tomorrow, with a capacity to trade 6 billion
shares a day, a tenfold increase since 1997.
Figure 10.2. Evolution of Nasdaq. (Source: Nasdaq)
1997 (see Figure 10.3), because it was the largest and most liquid mar-
ket in Europe for emerging growth companies during the time period
we consider. (In 2002, it was merged back into the Deutsche Bo¨rse,
following the collapse of the market for technology IPOs.)
Foreign companies accounted for 8 percent of IPOs on Nasdaq
between 1988 and 2001, and represented 14 percent of offerings on the
Neuer Markt between 1997 and 2001. While there has been variabil-
ity in the percentage of non-domestic listings on both exchanges, there
was a steady increase in the percentage of foreign listings until 2000
on Nasdaq and until 1999 on the Neuer Markt (see Figure 10.4). In
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Origin In March 1997, Deutsche Bo¨rse AG (the entity operating the
FSE) established a new trading platform within the
Freiverkehr segment, called the Neuer Markt.
Target It serves small to medium-sized innovative growth companies,
in particular in the telecom, Internet, multimedia,
entertainment software, biotech, and other high-tech areas.
Performance The Neuer Markt by far outperformed the other market
segments and contributed significantly to the increase in IPO
activity in Germany. It attracted more than 320 issuers, some
20 percent of which are foreign.
Platform It has not only become Europe’s largest market for IPOs of
German innovative growth companies, but also a platform
for high-tech companies from other European countries,
Israel and the United States.
Figure 10.3. Neuer Markt.
2000, while there was a 27 percent decline in Nasdaq’s domestic IPOs
from the preceding year, non-domestic IPOs jumped 50 percent. The
seventy-eight non-domestic IPOs – an all-time high for a single year –
accounted for more than 19 percent of the total IPOs on Nasdaq in
2000.
While a few countries dominate each exchange, Figure 10.5 shows
the increasing geographic diversity of countries listed on both Nasdaq
and the NM (although it does level off in 2000). This trend points to the
increased receptiveness of investors on both exchanges to embracing
innovative companies from around the world, despite the greater asym-
metry of information about these non-domestic companies. It provides
evidence of the true globalizing nature of equity capital markets for
promising entrepreneurial firms.
Drivers
These patterns of increasing use of non-domestic capital markets by
entrepreneurial firms are driven by some of the broader trends toward
globalization outlined in the introduction to this book. First, the liber-
alization of capital markets along with a general harmonization of
regulations, such as capital market regulations, taxes, etc., clearly
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2009
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Figure 10.4. The increasing share of non-domestic IPOs on Nasdaq and the
Neuer Markt.
foster cross-border flows of capital to support entrepreneurial com-
panies. The creation of a common currency for the European Union,
for example, reduced both currency risk and administrative barriers
to investing, thereby facilitating cross-border investment in private
local firms by non-local investors, both from within and outside the
European Union. Second, rapid advances in technology and acceler-
ating information flows make the investment process more efficient
by enabling investors to meet their information needs and transact
business at reduced cost. For example, firms can disseminate informa-
tion to investors and analysts using teleconferencing technology, which
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Figure 10.5. Number of foreign countries represented on Nasdaq and the
Neuer Markt (cumulative IPOs). Note: Does not take into account delistings.
helps the latter avoid travel costs. Third, the trend toward an increased
mobility of products implies that local firms are selling greater fractions
of their output on global markets, which in some cases necessitates an
enhanced presence in the foreign markets. One strategic rationale for
raising funds in foreign markets, therefore, can be to improve a firm’s
visibility and brand recognition.
Some surprising findings
While the overall increase in foreign listings may be expected in the
context of a globalizing world, there are some surprising findings from
these data.
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Many foreign listings come from countries with healthy domestic
exchanges: These foreign IPOs spanned a wide range of countries of
origin in both markets, as shown in Figures 10.6 and 10.7. By the
end of 2001, there were forty-four non-US countries represented on
the Nasdaq. Three countries, in particular, accounted for 53 percent
of listings by foreign firms between 1988 and 2001: Israeli companies
had 86 IPOs, Canadian companies had 73 IPOs, and UK companies
had 54 IPOs. As shown in Figure 10.6, there was a total of 44 non-
German companies from ten countries that listed their IPOs on the
Neuer Markt; four countries accounted for 70 percent of these non-
domestic IPOs: Austrian companies had twelve, US companies had five,
and Israeli and Dutch companies had seven each.
This raises some interesting questions. Why would so many
Canadian and UK firms find it advantageous, despite the high cost
associated with such offerings, to list on Nasdaq even though there are
well-developed capital markets in their home countries? Why would
some US firms choose to list on the NM, despite having the most devel-
oped capital market for emerging growth firms at home?
The average age of foreign companies on the NM is less than that
of their domestic peers, yet these younger firms have a higher aver-
age market cap: Another surprising finding is that the average age of
foreign companies that list on the NM is less than the average of the
German companies that list there, and these younger companies have
a higher average market cap. The age of non-domestic firms on the
Neuer Markt averages 9.7 years compared to 12 years for their German
peers.4 Investors faced with greater uncertainty about non-domestic
companies might be expected to look for older firms with more histor-
ical data to compensate for the greater asymmetry of information. But
this caution is absent, and there is no evidence of reluctance to make
large investments in these younger companies, as might be expected.
Quite the opposite. By comparing the average market capitalization
to the age of the listing company, we observe an inverse relationship:
the younger the company, the higher its market capitalization on the
NM. Again, this is surprising, as investors have less historical infor-
mation about younger companies. The fact that their capitalization
is higher may reflect higher expectations about their future earning
potential.
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Figure 10.8. Issue price vs. first price (average), Neuer Markt, 1997–2001.
The “IPO discount” is not as steep for foreign firms: One of the costs
associated with an IPO is the so-called “IPO discount,” namely the
issue price versus the closing price on the first day of trading.5 We
would expect non-domestic firms to suffer a steeper discount owing to
the higher potential for asymmetry of information, but we found the
opposite on the NM. From 1997 to 2000, the percentage difference
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Figure 10.9. Percentage difference between the issue price and the first price,
Neuer Markt, 1997–2001.
between the issue price and the closing price on the first trading
day for non-domestic firms was smaller than for domestic firms (see
Figures 10.8 and 10.9). This is particularly puzzling, as foreign firms
on the NM, on average, are younger than domestic firms at the time
of IPO.
Possible explanations could include the geographic dispersion of
buyers. If the preference of German investors is to buy German stock
rather than the stock of foreign companies, and if this preference is
not anticipated by the bankers who price the new issue, greater under-
pricing of domestic firms may result. Similarly, on the Nasdaq, we also
found that non-domestic firms have a smaller percentage difference
between the issue price and the closing price on the first trading day
than domestic firms (see Figures 10.10 and 10.11).
Globalizing entrepreneurs: weighing the benefits and costs
What implications do these data and patterns have for entrepreneurs
faced with the complex decision of where to conduct an initial pub-
lic offering for their companies? The entrepreneur who wanted to
raise public equity before the 1980s faced a relatively straightforward
decision – an IPO at home (if there was a home market for young,
entrepreneurial firms at all). Today, the opportunities are more diverse,
making costs and benefits harder to assess. Should this entrepreneur
stick to home markets or take the company’s roadshow across borders
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Figure 10.10. Issue price vs. first price (average), Nasdaq, 1990–2001. (Note:
Analysis excludes seven companies for which first-price data are not available.)
to another market? How is this offering likely to be received at home
and in the foreign market? There are no simple answers to this complex
question, but by identifying the relative costs and benefits of sticking
close to home or taking the offering abroad, managers can more fully
analyze and weigh such decisions.
In the following subsections, we explore these costs and benefits in
more detail. This discussion is informed by both the empirical research
discussed above and academic literature, and is complemented by our
own field research, including a questionnaire completed by senior exec-
utives of foreign firms that listed on the Neuer Markt.6
Benefits to entrepreneurs of listing their firms on
a foreign exchange
Why have so many Canadian and British entrepreneurs taken their
IPOs to Nasdaq? What are US and Israeli companies doing on the
Neuer Markt? Many of these non-domestic companies are attracted to
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Figure 10.11. Percentage difference between the issue price and the first price,
Nasdaq, 1990–2001. Note: Analysis excludes seven companies for which first-
price data are not available.)
the various benefits of listing on a foreign exchange. Seven of these are
discussed here.
Access to equity capital
First and foremost, entrepreneurs raise funds because they need capital
to build and grow their firms, organically or by acquisition. Consid-
ering their need for significant cash infusions, entrepreneurs are more
likely to consider a foreign listing when the amount of money they can
expect to raise in the foreign market is higher than in their local capital
market. In one particular case, for instance, a firm with founders who
were citizens of a foreign country chose to list in that country because
“the bankers felt that because of [their] roots and [their] expansion
goals [they] could make a significant investment case,” thus increasing
the firm’s odds of raising much needed capital.
However, it may be more difficult for entrepreneurial firms to gain
access to foreign capital markets due to asymmetric information prob-
lems. Investors buying shares in these markets may find it more difficult
to obtain, interpret, or evaluate relevant information on the company’s
management, products, services, and markets. As a result, the greater
asymmetry of information about non-domestic firms tends to drive up
the cost of capital for the entrepreneurial firm which attempts to list
its securities on public non-domestic capital markets.
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Liquidity for existing investors
Existing investors, including founders, senior managers, and employees
who own stock (options), might wish to cash out some of their vested
holdings in the company during its IPO and also in future rounds.
(An IPO usually opens up the door for secondary offerings at some
later point in time.) This “need for liquidity” argument is important
in bull markets when the valuations of entrepreneurial firms are high.
It also can be true in bear markets when investors may experience
cash shortages or downright crises, and thus develop a preference for
liquidity. To the extent that foreign capital markets offer a better chance
to conduct a successful IPO (for example, because the local IPO market
suffers from bad local economic conditions), entrepreneurs may prefer
to list on a foreign exchange rather than on a local exchange.
Company shares and stock options are also an important incentive
for employees and entrepreneurs to perform well. In general, the better
the chances for a successful liquidity event such as an initial public
offering, the more effective these incentives. Moreover, while existing
strategic or financial investors may appreciate the possibility of liquid-
ity, entrepreneurs may appreciate the opportunity to regain control of
their firms7 or to avoid control by private investors such as venture
capitalists. Entrepreneurs might also benefit from a greater volume of
transactions in a foreign market, as that tends to increase the market
capitalization of the company and thereby reduce transaction dilution
of the entrepreneurs at the IPO (see the discussion of valuation below).
Reputation, publicity, and visibility for entrepreneurial firms, abroad
and at home
While Jay Ritter and Ivo Welch surmise that in general these factors
play “only a minor role for most firms,”8 in the particular case of
non-domestic entrepreneurial firms trying to get a foothold in foreign
product and/or factor markets, these considerations can be important.
Our data indicate that strategic reasons motivate many entrepreneurial
companies to list on non-domestic markets. They strongly desire to
increase their reputation and build their presence in the foreign market
in which they have chosen to list. This motivation for foreign listing has
been confirmed in a number of interviews with executives. Executives
of the Austrian company AT&S, which listed on the Neuer Markt in
July 1999, suggested they chose the German market over the Austrian
market because it enhanced the company’s prestige and international
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visibility, which helped it to recruit highly specialized foreign techni-
cians to positions in the company. A similar argument was made by
Highlight Communication, a Swiss company that listed on the NM.
Its leaders claim the listing allowed it to expand faster by increasing
its visibility and reputation. The Israeli company On Track Innovation
chose to list on the NM since it considered Germany to be its most
important market and consequently wanted to have increased visibility
there. Firms that listed outside their country of origin were able to make
useful contacts in the foreign markets, became better known, gained
prestige, increased their visibility and public relations, improved their
familiarity with the foreign product markets, and eventually increased
their sales and market share.
The challenge for most entrepreneurial firms is to overcome the lia-
bilities of smallness and newness,9 which may be even more compli-
cated in foreign markets, where a lack of track record and trading
history may weigh heavily against non-domestic entrepreneurial firms.
Foreign firms that want to establish credibility and legitimacy with
potential customers, suppliers, investors, employees, or creditors may
wish to do so by listing on the exchange of the target country, thus
signaling their trustworthiness, quality, and commitment to establish
a long-term presence in the market.
These moves not only enhance the company’s reputation in foreign
markets, but also can add to its image at home. Some firms use a foreign
listing to create a corporate identity as an international company and
avoid being perceived as a local player. They reasoned that significant
market opportunities lay outside their local product markets, and these
could be captured only by expanding the firm internationally. These
firms wanted to create an image that was consistent with their expan-
sion strategy. A related, but slightly different motive for foreign firms to
list on the Neuer Markt, for example, was to associate themselves with
the leading “new economy” exchange in Europe. They reasoned that
they would benefit from a reputation spillover and therefore would be
perceived as high-tech companies.
Interestingly, our qualitative interview data show that domestic firms
may benefit from being listed on a foreign exchange if their objective is
to acquire other domestic firms. Having an internationally recognized
brand can enhance the perception of the company by domestic players
as a reliable and valuable partner.
Companies also sometimes move to foreign markets to keep up with
rivals. For example, a Swiss firm decided to raise equity capital on the
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2009
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Neuer Markt because “our competitors were on the Neuer Markt.” It
was presumably necessary to create a perception of competitive parity
for customers, investors, and partners. These reasons for listing on a
foreign exchange have not received much attention in either the finance
or entrepreneurship literature to date.
Currency for acquisitions
Many firms that went public in the late 1990s pursued aggressive acqui-
sition strategies, using their own company’s shares, rather than cash,
as a currency for acquisitions.10 This tactic is particularly attractive for
entrepreneurial, high-growth firms as it preserves cash reserves needed
to fuel the company’s growth. Of course, the prerequisite for success
of such a financing approach is for the acquiring firm to be publicly
listed, as the shares of private companies commonly trade at a sig-
nificant discount relative to comparable public firms. This argument
becomes particularly relevant for entrepreneurial firms that intend to
acquire firms in a foreign market where the shares listed on their home
exchange (e.g. Korea) might not be considered a valid currency. This
would provide an incentive to firms focused on growth through acqui-
sitions in foreign markets to list their shares in these markets.
Exit opportunities
Listing on a foreign exchange might increase the awareness of poten-
tial foreign acquirers of an entrepreneurial firm, while at the same
time improving the target firm’s bargaining position. This is because
acquirers cannot exert pressure as easily on outside investors as on
privately held firms.11 In addition, the public market valuation puts a
floor on the sales price, and the acquirer may actually have to pay a
premium to convince public shareholders to take up the tender offer.
An entrepreneurial firm might look at listing on a foreign capital mar-
ket as possibly increasing the expected benefits from a trade sale in two
ways: first, the decision to list on a foreign capital market may increase
its chances of appearing on the radar screen of potential foreign
acquirers; and, second, listing on the foreign market may result in a
higher valuation than it would have had in its domestic capital market.
Dispersion of ownership
Increased dispersion of ownership may be attractive to entrepreneurs
for several reasons. First, as Thomas Chemmanur and Paolo Fulghieri
point out, diversified investors are generally willing to pay a higher
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price for a firm’s shares than non-diversified investors, such as angel
investors (i.e. individuals who invest their own money in privately held
firms) or venture capitalists (i.e. institutional investors who invest other
people’s money in privately held companies).12 Second, entrepreneurs
may find it easier to deal with a more dispersed ownership base where
no single shareholder wields too much power.
The two advantages mentioned above hold for all publicly listed
firms when compared with privately held firms. Listing on a foreign
market offers the added benefit of having a geographically dispersed
shareholder base, which may reinforce the aforementioned advantages.
It might also reduce volatility in the stock price because of differential
patterns of behavior of cross-cultural investors in response to events in
the company. Thus, an Israeli firm going public in the United States may
benefit, for example, from having both American and Israeli sharehold-
ers – two different groups of investors who may respond differently to
important events. The decision may also offer the American investors
an opportunity for geographic diversification.
Valuation
Listing on a foreign exchange offers the possibility of achieving a higher
valuation than might be possible in a domestic market. That is true
if the foreign exchange has higher liquidity or if the entrepreneurial
firm attracts international institutional investors to which it otherwise
would not have access, thus increasing the demand for its shares. A
higher valuation implies less dilution for the entrepreneurs when they
raise new funds, and decreases the firm’s costs of raising new funds.
Primary motives for foreign listings
Our survey results revealed that the most popular motive for these firms
to list on a foreign exchange was to raise equity (100%), followed by
strategic considerations to increase publicity and visibility (60%), and
the desire to have access to international investors in order to increase
the geographic dispersion of ownership (33%). About one-fourth of
our sample firms (27%) were driven by liquidity concerns, and about
the same number (20%) intended to use their shares as a currency
for acquisitions. Surprisingly few firms mentioned as motives a higher
valuation (7%) or the desire to increase exit opportunities by becoming
an attractive target for acquisitions (0%).
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When asked about realized (as opposed to expected) benefits, almost
half the foreign firms (47%) discovered that they could use their shares
as currency for acquisitions. This represented more than twice as many
as had expected to derive this advantage from listing on a foreign
exchange. By contrast, firms that hoped for increased liquidity seem to
have been disappointed; only 7% noted it as a realized benefit.
These results shed interesting light on the frequently mentioned
motives for public listing. Apparently, some of these motives matter
more for non-domestic firms than for domestic companies. And the
differences in importance that entrepreneurs attach to these motives
can be substantial.
Costs and risks to entrepreneurs of listing their firms on a
foreign exchange
The benefits of listing on foreign exchanges have to be weighed against
the costs and risks of taking an IPO to these markets. We consider these
costs under five headings, paying particular attention to whether these
costs might be different for non-domestic as compared to domestic
entrepreneurial firms:
Under-pricing and dilution
The reasons for under-pricing cited in the literature include the win-
ner’s curse,13 the market feedback hypothesis,14 and the bandwagon
hypothesis.15 These explanations are based on the existence of asym-
metric information (or behavior) among various investors; they assume
that there are informed and uninformed investors. In addition, they
assume that the degree of asymmetric information between the issuing
firm and the average investor does not vary.
Do the theories mentioned above predict differential under-pricing
of domestic and non-domestic firms? And, if yes, what is the rela-
tive magnitude of the under-pricing? First, consider that the degree of
asymmetric information between issuers and investors could be big-
ger for non-domestic than for domestic firms, because, for example,
the evaluation of information given by non-domestic firms might be
more difficult than the evaluation of the same information given by
domestic firms. Following George Akerlof’s adverse selection logic, this
implies that the average quality of foreign issues will be lower than the
average quality of domestic issues, as relatively more excellent foreign
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issues than domestic issues would tend to stay away from a market in
which they do not receive a fair valuation.16 Since the ratio of “bad”
to “good” firms will be higher for foreign than for domestic firms, the
winner’s curse and the bandwagon hypothesis would predict greater
under-pricing of foreign than domestic IPOs.
However, if there are reasons that would lead us to expect that the
average quality of foreign firms seeking listing is higher than the average
quality of domestic firms, then, based on the above theories, we would
expect smaller under-pricing of foreign firms as compared to domestic
firms. For example, very promising, rapidly growing foreign firms may
not really have the choice to list on their domestic capital markets
when the latter are too small to enable these firms to raise sufficient
capital to fuel their rapid growth. In those cases, high-quality issues
could find their way to global capital markets for entrepreneurial firms.
Another argument that would lead to the same conclusion is that the
cash costs (see below), as well as the opportunity costs, of going public
(e.g. management time spent traveling) are higher for non-domestic
firms, hence only those firms that are doing exceptionally well will
incur these costs.
IPO costs
There are direct costs of undertaking an IPO that are non-trivial. The
cash costs of going public include underwriting fees paid to the invest-
ment bankers (usually 7 percent of the total offering amount), filing
fees (e.g. the Securities and Exchange Commission charges $92 for each
$1m raised), listing fees (e.g. $100k–$155k for Nasdaq, depending
on the number of shares offered), legal and accounting fees (typically
$500k–$1m in the United States), printing expenses for the prospectus
(typically $200k–$300k), costs incurred for the roadshow (typically
$100k), directors’ and officers’ insurance (typically $500k–$1m), and
other cash fees (e.g. for consultants, press conferences, etc.).17 To these
cash costs we must add the opportunity costs of management time
spent on building and improving investor relations. Given the need for
international travel and the barriers to intercultural communication,18
these opportunity costs arguably are higher for foreign than for domes-
tic firms. Our survey suggests that these costs are often underestimated.
Some of these costs are fixed, so that for small issues the proportional
cost of going public (as well as that of secondary offerings) can be
quite high. Entrepreneurs compare the costs of going public on various
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exchanges (including their domestic one), and, to the extent that the
costs might be lower on a foreign than on a domestic exchange, they
might prefer a foreign listing. One American firm in our sample, for
instance, chose to list on the Neuer Markt rather than on Nasdaq
chiefly because it had hoped to take advantage of lower listing costs.
Reporting requirements and other recurring costs
Further costs to be considered in going public include the potential costs
of litigation, as well as recurring disclosure requirements (e.g. quarterly
reports, audits, shareholder meetings), which some firms can only meet
by hiring additional personnel (usually one or two new employees to
take care of investor relations). The disclosure of company-specific
information may also entail indirect costs by inviting imitators and
attracting product market competition.19 The increased scrutiny exer-
cised by public shareholders can lead to a (perceived) loss of control
and flexibility, and dealing with board issues can be perceived as time-
consuming and costly. Other recurring costs include listing fees, fees
for auditors, and fees for market makers.
Risk of negative spillover from failure of the exchange
Companies listing on a foreign exchange also face the risk that a new
exchange might develop a negative reputation, and that this reputa-
tion will spill over to the listed companies. This was actually the case
for Germany’s Neuer Markt, which ceased to exist in 2002. Although
the risk of negative reputation spillover is difficult to assess ex ante,
it is clearly higher for newer exchanges than for more established
ones with higher trading volumes and more stringent listing require-
ments. Conversely, to the extent that the domestic market for public
entrepreneurial finance is new, and the respective foreign market is rel-
atively more established, domestic firms might choose to move to a
foreign market that is perceived to be more stable.
Employee tax penalties
There may be special tax penalties for employees of firms listing on
a foreign exchange. For example, employees of Canadian firms listing
in Canada get the first CA$500,000 of capital gains tax-free, but do
not so if their company lists only abroad (e.g. in the United States).
Listing abroad thus imposes a tax cost on the firm’s employees who
own company shares.
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Globalizing entrepreneurship and venture capital
The data presented in this chapter clearly suggest that looking beyond
domestic capital markets and tapping foreign equity capital markets is
a viable alternative for some entrepreneurial companies. The data fur-
ther suggest that entrepreneurs must carefully examine the tradeoffs in
choosing whether to list on a domestic or on a non-domestic capital
market. Tradeoffs are of three types: financial tradeoffs, specifically
costs (cash costs, opportunity costs) versus benefits (amount of capi-
tal raised, trading volume, valuation); strategic tradeoffs, for which the
costs of competition and imitation must be weighed against the benefits
of legitimacy and credibility; and a third group, which can be consid-
ered entrepreneurial (i.e. company development). Here, the cost of the
loss of focus on developing the company must be weighed against the
benefits of increased opportunities for growth, both financial and in
markets.
Our analysis suggests that the factors that seem to make globaliz-
ing entrepreneurs prefer a foreign listing to a domestic one are often
strategic and organizational in nature. Many founders hope to raise
the company’s visibility in foreign product and factor markets both
by raising equity in these markets and by establishing relationships,
trust, and track records with foreign investors, investment banks, and
institutions. In addition, a substantial number of entrepreneurial firms
that (plan to) operate internationally have adopted, or strive to adopt,
an international image. While being rooted (e.g. headquartered) in a
specific country, these entrepreneurial firms consider themselves multi-
national (e.g. pan-European rather than Dutch). By listing on a for-
eign exchange, they seek to enhance and make consistent their chosen
corporate identity. These considerations confirm our belief that the
emergence of global capital markets for entrepreneurs documented in
this chapter goes hand in hand with broader trends toward globalizing
product and factor markets.
Some companies have chosen a dual listings approach; that is, they
have floated their securities, either simultaneously or sequentially, on
both domestic and non-domestic capital markets. This approach, while
more costly, enables companies to enjoy the potential benefits of a
domestic listing, such as offering domestic investors easy access to the
company’s securities and providing employees with potential tax bene-
fits, while at the same time enjoying the fruits associated with a foreign
listing discussed above.
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The emerging trend of globalizing public capital markets, which
we documented in this chapter, has implications for private equity
markets as well. Anticipating the possibility of exiting their invest-
ment in global capital markets, many private equity firms have opened
branches or developed co-investment partnerships in non-domestic
capital markets, thereby providing additional sources of capital to
aspiring entrepreneurs. For example, over 340 leading US firms have
an Israeli, European, or Asian focus.20 These funds source investments
globally and inject managerial and financial discipline early on in the
development of the company. This discipline, coupled with the venture
capitalists’ knowledge of the US capital market, gives the investee firms
easier access to the US public market. Hence there is an externality in
the capital formation process for entrepreneurial firms: the opening of
public markets to non-domestic firms makes it attractive for domes-
tic private equity investors to make foreign investments. These invest-
ments, in turn, make it easier for the investees to access foreign public
capital markets.
The emergence of global private and public capital markets for
entrepreneurial firms is likely to accelerate the pace of commercial-
izing innovations, and contribute to job creation and economic devel-
opment. Furthermore, despite the overall slowdown of domestic ven-
ture capital and private equity investments since the peak year of 2000
when $94.4 billion were invested by US-based firms in 6,142 domestic
and foreign transactions,21 the globalization of US private equity firms
continues. This trend, in turn, points to the expectation of investors
that once the public market for young, emerging growth firms reopens,
non-domestic firms will be able to gain access to the public market as
well.
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